Oklahoma Law Review
Volume 50

Number 3

1-1-1997

Introduction: How Can Property Be Political?
Zev Trachtenberg

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, Law and Philosophy Commons, and the Law and Politics
Commons

Recommended Citation
Zev Trachtenberg, Introduction: How Can Property Be Political?, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 303 (2020),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol50/iss3/2

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Oklahoma Law Review by an authorized editor of University of
Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact LawLibraryDigitalCommons@ou.edu.

OKLAHOMA
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 50

FALL, 1997

NUMBER 3

INTRODUCTION: HOW CAN PROPERTY BE
POLITICAL?
ZEV TRACHTENBERG*

Although the goal of protecting the natural environment has gained increasing
importance over the last generation, in recent years it has faced a number of serious
challenges, not the least of which is the charge that it is inconsistent with respect
for private property rights. At the federal, state, and local levels, advocates for the
environment and defenders of property rights have contended with each other in
courts, in legislatures, before agencies, and in the arena of public opinion. Thus, the
conflict between environment and property has emerged as one of the thorniest
political issues of the day, one which is national in scope, but which has immediate
meaning for every community.
It was with this conflict in mind that legal scholars and practitioners, academics
from a range of disciplines, and members of the public came together at the
University of Oklahoma on April 26, 1997 for a symposium on Environmental
Protection and the Politics of Property Rights. Sponsored by OU's Interdisciplinary
Perspectives on the Environment program, the gathering provided a forum for
exploring society's efforts to negotiate the proper boundary between private rights
and public control over important features of the environment.
Three invited speakers were heard: Andrew Sawyer, Assistant Chief Counsel of
the California Water Resources Control Board, presented an overview of the takings
implications of the famous Mono Lake case; James L. Huffman, Dean of the
Northwestern School of Law, Lewis and Clark College, offered a defense of private
property rights in environmental values; and John D. Echeverria, General Counsel
of the National Audubon Society, gave an analysis of the present state of the
political battle between environmental advocates and the property rights movement.
To provide an interdisciplinary outlook, comments were provided by members of
the University of Oklahoma faculty representing three different approaches to the
conference topic: Drew Kershen, of the College of Law, showed how the
presentations raised legal issues that are also at work in Oklahoma cases; Baxter
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Vieux, of the School of Engineering and Environmental Science, related the
presentations to his practical experience in the U.S. and Europe; and I, a faculty
member of the University's Philosophy Department, considered how the presentations posed questions about the nature and justification of property rights.
Informed and revised in light of the discussions on the day between speakers,
commentators, and audience members, the presentations and comments are
presented here.
By way of a conceptual introduction, it is worth examining what it means to
consider the question of balancing environmental protection and property rights as
a political matter. In the Anglo-American tradition, perhaps the central role of the
political system is the enforcement of private property rights. But it is a matter of
substantial dispute whether or not property rights themselves are to be understood
as having a political character - that is, whether the content and extent of the right
of property are matters for political debate and decision, or rather are facts given
in advance of politics. Since society's effort to preserve environmental values
requires a degree of interference in what people wish to do with their own, it is
inevitable that this dispute over the fundamental nature of property will be
provoked.
Let us approach the question of the nature of property from a practical standpoint.
To call property a right implies that an owner is entitled to noninterference in his
or her enjoyment of the good in question, in particular noninterference by the
government. In practice, of course, the government may interfere in an owner's use
of his or her property when that use threatens to harm others. In practical terms,
then, the individual's right of property is bounded by the government's right to
regulate property use in the interest of preventing harms. This simple formula
stands behind Ernst Freund's classic statement of the distinction between the police
power and eminent domain: "[I]t may be said that the state takes property by
eminent domain because it is useful to the public, and under the police power
because it is harmful . .. ."
The requirement that compensation be paid in cases of eminent domain, but not
for exercises of the police power follows from Freund's dictum. It is just that the
public bear the costs for the benefits provided by eminent domain; it would be
unjust to compel an individual to subsidize the common good. Conversely, it is only
just that parties responsible for harms to others bear the costs involved in
prevention; it would be unjust to impose that burden on those subject to the danger.
Compensation practice thus gives effect to the intuition that there is no right to use
property in a harmful way - that one's property right is limited to uses that do not
cause harm to others.2 That is why no compensation is required in police power
cases: since no property right is infringed, no property is taken. By contrast, the

I. ERNST FREUND, TIE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS § 511
(1904).
2. See JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 11-12 (1984);
JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 9 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Pub'g 1980)
(1690).
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payment of compensation in eminent domain affirms that the affected owner had a
right to the goods taken, i.e., that they were his or her property, for which the
payment is meant to be a just exchange?
Freund's principle thus allows us to approach the boundary of property from the
outside, so to speak - property begins where the government's right to interfere
ends. That line is determined by whether the government's action provides a benefit
or prevents a harm. But how are we to tell? Two considerations seem relevant here:
First, something is beneficial or harmful with respect to some condition or other e.g., one's health, or the state of one's reputation. Second, for that condition there
is some minimum threshold or baseline which is accepted as an enforceable
entitlement.4 Although the condition above the baseline is certainly desirable, it is
only when conditions fall below it that government is held to have the right to
intervene. Thus, in respect of that right, benefit and harm are not defined simply as
positive and negative changes in the given condition. Rather, they are changes that
cross the threshold.5
In a practical sense, therefore, the contours of the right of property are set by the
understanding of the threshold condition or baseline which separates benefits from
harms. But how does the notion of a baseline help establish whether property rights
have a political or nonpolitical character? Simply put, the political nature of
property rights depends on how the condition and relevant baseline are conceived.
Some conceptions lead to the view that the right of property is defined independently ("in advance") of political experience, while others lead to the view that the
content of that right must be determined politically. I will briefly review four
conceptions to illustrate the contrast.
The first conception is closely allied to the view that property is a natural right,
hence conceptually prior to politics, and immune to political modification.
Defenders of the idea of natural rights standardly make use of the narrative device
of a "state of nature," and argue that the natural right to property is grounded in a
fundamental human right to survive.' Insofar as the goods of the Earth are needed
for survival, individual ownership is justified as a way to execute that basic right.7
Individuals survive by consuming goods; to enable consumption they must have a
right to those goods against other individuals; they gain this property right either by

3. See U.S. CONsT. amend V ("[Nior shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."). This phrase is known as the Takings Clause.
4. See FEINBERG, supra note 2, at 53-54.
5. See id.
6. Religious versions of this argument, to the effect that God grants human beings dominion over
the Earth, are found in the classical natural rights theorists. See HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND
PEACE 186 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 1925) (1646); LOCKE, supra note 2, at 18;
SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING TO NATURAL LAW 84 (James
Tully ed., Michael Silverhome trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1673). Contemporary versions of
the argument take a more secular tack. See, e.g., RICHARD ALLEN EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY
AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 11-12 (1985); ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
EMINENT DOMAIN 224-39 (1987).
7. See JAMES TULLY, A DISCOURSE ON PROPERTY: JOHN LOCKE AND His ADVERSARIES passim

(1980).
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original appropriation of goods not claimed by others, or by exchange. Of course,
each individual's right to property is limited by the right of each other individual to
survive as well.
Therefore, harm is defined in terms of the threshold condition of being able to
execute one's right to survival! Locke's famous "proviso" that appropriators in the
state of nature leave "enough, and as good"9 reflects this rights-based conception
of harm. Individuals are not under the obligation to ensure that their fellows
survive, but only to ensure that they have the opportunity to survive - it is up to
each to provide for his or her own survival, through his or her own labor.
In the state of nature story, the baseline between harm and benefit is established
prior to political life, implying that the limits on property rights that correspond to
that baseline are a conceptual given, not subject to modification through political
discussion. Specifically, neither that baseline nor the moral limits on property it
specifies change when people enter into society. Rather, people enter into society
to enforce the property relations that develop in keeping with that baseline, and are
morally justified by it. If the dimensions of the right of property were changed as
a result of the political process (e.g., by a majority vote), increased entitlements for
some would correlatively produce liabilities against such pre-existing (and
sufficiently justified) rights of others. Thus, the political redistribution of property
rights would violate the moral foundations on which the political system itself is
based.
It follows that the natural rights view of harm is in general hostile to the use of
the police power to further the goals of environmental protection. Short of obvious
cases where a property owner poses a clear physical danger to others (e.g., by
allowing toxins to seep into neighbors' water), acts purported to harm the
environment (e.g., by causing loss of habitat, or loss of scenic amenities) do not fall
outside the scope of legitimate property rights.'" As a matter of public policy it
might be advisable for the government to preserve a wide range of environmental
values. But, when this requires interference in private property rights, the
government must act by eminent domain, and pay just compensation.
Second, while the first conception of the baseline between benefit and harm
seems to favor property rights over environmental values, the second conception we
shall consider has the opposite effect - while at the same time affirming the belief
that the baseline is a given, hence that the content of the right of property is not
subject to political review. This second conception appeals to the belief that human
well-being rests in various ways on an environmental foundation. First, human
beings draw on the environment for the raw materials and energy that are inputs
into their economies. Well-being in the economic sense, that is, relies on "natural

8. 1say the ability to execute one's right to survival, as opposed to survival itself. Ifollow Locke,
who insists that the goods of the Earth are for "the industrious and rational," i.e., for those who make
the effort to use them. LOCKE, supra note 2, at 21.
9. Locke, supra note 2, at 21.
10. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1021-23 (1992) (holding that only
property uses that pose a clear nuisance can be regulated without violating the Takings Clause).
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capital," and actions that damage that form of capital can be as harmful as
violations of fiduciary trust regarding financial capital." Second, as organisms
within the environment, human beings are organically affected by environmental
changes. Well-being in the sense of physical health, that is, can be diminished by
a decline in environmental quality. Third, people are also affected psychologically
by the condition of their surroundings. Well-being in a psychic sense thus seems
to require access to the natural world, preserved to some degree of integrity.'"
While the first version of the baseline is allied with the classical liberal view that
the role of the state is to provide conditions in which individuals can pursue their
own notions of what makes for a good human life, the second version moves toward
the view that the state should recognize and enforce a particular conception of wellbeing for its citizens.'3 Actions which lessen people's prospects for a good life as
defined by that conception are thus the sort of harms that government is obligated
to prevent. On this view, then, government could employ the police power to
interfere in property uses that would affect the environment in ways that lessened
human well-being; such uses would not be encompassed in owners' property rights.
Since well-being is conceived as relying on a broad range of environmental features,
the scope of private owners' rights over the environment would thus be much
narrower than with the first view.
Despite this contrast, the contours of the right of property in both views are
established in a nonpolitical way, in virtue of the character of the baseline as a
given. Under the second view, the conditions of human well-being are an objective
matter, revealed by scientific investigation into the connections between the
environment and human life. This view thus suggests the idea of "environmental
platonism," whereby property rules are devised and enforced by a cadre of experts
("eco-guardians"), on the basis of criteria formulated independently of any political
deliberation.'
Third, with the first two conceptions of the baseline, the definition of harm is a
conceptual given; hence, the limit of the right of property is conceptually independent of governmental authority and not subject to political revision. The third
conception begins to show how the definition of harm can change, leading to
politically instituted changes in the extent of property rights. This conception is
inspired by utilitarian thinking about property.
Utilitarianism justifies governmental action by reference to the net balance of
satisfaction over dissatisfaction across society. Harm then involves a negative
balance - where the "costs" of an action outweigh the "benefits." But as noted
above, we must refer to some threshold point on the continuum of degrees of net
satisfaction. Following Jeremy Bentham, we can identify this baseline with the

11. See Salah El Serafy, The Environment as Capital,in ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS: THE SCIENCE
AND MANAGEMENT OF SUSTAINABILITY 168, 171 (Robert Costanza ed., 1992).
12. See THE BIOPHILIA HYPOTHESIS passim (Stephen R. Kellert & Edward 0. Wilson eds., 1993).
13. John Rawls refers to this sort of view as perfectionism. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 25, 325 (1971).
14. See H.J. MCCLOSKEY, ECOLOGICAL ETHICS AND POLITICS 157 (1983).
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"established expectations" of people regarding the continued enjoyment of their
goods and the future return on their investments. 5 That is, the baseline between
benefit and harm is that balance of satisfaction that is struck when established
expectations are respected. Thus, if individual property uses would interfere with
established expectations, the balance of satisfaction would fall below the threshold,
and that use could be legitimately enjoined under the police power.
While Bentham was concerned with individuals' expectations regarding their
private goods, consideration of the environment reminds us that the utilitarian
calcfilation should take account of those satisfactions people derive from environmental goods. Especially where environmental goods are publicly owned, the
public's "established expectations" regarding them should thus be factored into the
location of the baseline between benefit and harm. But what "establishes" a publicly
held expectation sufficiently for it to be enforced through the rules of property?
Note that a related question can also be asked regarding environmental goods that
are held privately: might public expectations regarding that good outweigh the
private expectations of its owner?
These questions raise an explicitly normative one: what legitimizes people's
expectations regarding property? Plausibly the answer is a broad social consensus,
evidenced by long ut age. But we must bear in mind that a social consensus is
dynamic: it changes as people's attitudes change, in response to slow developments,
or relatively sudden shifts. 7 On the utilitarian conception of the baseline, then, the
limits of property rights will change in response to changes in the social consensus.
It can be argued that public discussions generated by the increasing environmental
concern of recent decades have begun to work a change in the people's expectations
about property. On this view, the current political debate over the appropriate means
for protecting the environment is part of a social process by which the consensus,
and thus the content of the right of property, will be revised.
Fourth, the utilitarian conception of the baseline introduces a dynamic understanding of the right of property. The extent and content of that right is defined, and
can be revised, by society's political institutions, in response to underlying changes
in the social understanding of what constitutes a harm. The last conception we shall
consider is likewise dynamic, but it incorporates a criticism of utilitarianism and
presents an even more robustly political picture of property.
For utilitarianism, the role of political institutions generally, and the property
regime in particular, is to maximize satisfaction across society. The baseline of
harm is a lower bound to the acceptable level of general utility. If, say, one owner

15. See Jeremy Bentham, Security and Equality of Property, in PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND
CRITICAL POSITIONS 51 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1978). For a contemporary statement of Bentham's view,
see Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundationsof "Just
Compensation" Law 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1211-58 (1967).
16. See CAROL M. ROSE, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, in PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF
OWNERSHIP 105, 105-62 (1994).

17. For example, the abolitionist movement and then the Civil War led to the exclusion of human
beings from the range of permissible property.
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did not respect another's established expectations, society would suffer net
dissatisfaction - hence, the government is permitted to prevent such actions. Thus,
for utilitarianism, the function of politics in establishing property rules is purely
instrumental: it is to provide for maximum utility by optimally reconciling the
competing preferences held by everyone in society.
But this instrumentalist view is perhaps too weak a conception of politics, based
on a misleading conception of the individual. As Mark Sagoff argues, people are
more than havers of preferences - they are also judges of values." That is, people
distinguish among their own (and others') preferences, determining some to be more
worthy of satisfaction than others according to various standards of value. While
a preference is an affective state that a person simply has or does not have, a value
carries some cognitive content. Thus, while different people can simply observe the
similarities and dissimilarities among their respective preferences, with their
respective values they can do more. Specifically, they can explain and justify their
values, with the potential effect of persuading others to come around to their way
of seeing what is valuable. Politics can be conceived as embodying this process of
collective deliberation about values - indeed, for Aristotle, it is our ability to
deliberate over what is better and worse that makes human associations distinctively
political."
In this light, the baseline that separates benefit from harm can be seen as a matter
of socially held values. The ongoing social discussion of what is valuable will
produce some agreements on which political institutions can act. The baseline can
be conceived in terms of conditions that are deemed to meet minimal value criteria:
an action that alters conditions so that these criteria are not met counts as a harm
that can be enjoined by the government. However, just because the debate over
value is ongoing, any agreements that are produced will be dynamic - i.e.,
constantly under review, and subject to revision. As people gain experience of the
social life produced by their value agreements, they will reflect publicly about the
fitness of their values, and public agreements on values will changel In particular,
there will be changes in the agreements on the minimal criteria that define harm in other words, the baseline will shift.
On this last conception of the baseline, then, the right of property is political in
a quite fundamental sense. It is not simply the case, as with utilitarianism, that the
political process changes property rules in response to underlying social changes in
the conception of harm. More, on the current conception the change in the
conception of harm is itself political in nature - it grows out of a process of public
deliberation over values. This process is political in a broad way. It takes place
within specifically political institutions, in the courts, and in the culture at large -

18. See MARK SAGOFF, At the Shrine of Our Lady of Fatima; or, Why PoliticalQuestions Are Not
All Economic, in THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 24, 24-49

(1988).
19. See ARISTOTLE, PoLITIcs: BOOKS I AND II 2-4 (J.L. Ackrill & Linday Judson, eds., Trevor J.
Saunders trans., Clarendon Press 1995).
20. This claim is central to the outlook of John Dewey. See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND
ITS PROBLEMS 84 (1954).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020

310

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:303

and none of these contexts is sealed off from the others. Indeed, precisely this
broadly political process of deliberation is the setting for the present controversy
over the environment. As our society debates the value of the environment, it
reconsiders whether actions once viewed as beneficial are harmful instead - and
whether to change pi-operty rules in order to implement its reevaluations.
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